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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
more important interest of the public in unimpeded access to news-
worthy information. In the latter there should not be recovery; but
it is objectionable that in the former this public interest is said to
protect a publisher when such an interest is not present at all, simply
because it might have been. It is submitted that upon finding a lack
of legitimate public interest in the specific statements complained of,
a court should base its decision on a further investigation of whether
the defendant's intent was to commercially exploit plaintiff's private
life.
RICHARD BURROWS
Trusts-Deviation from Investment Restrictions
In 1924 James B. Duke established the Duke Endowment when
he transferred to trustees a large amount of securities, the income
of which was to be used for educational, religious and other chari-
table purposes." The trust indenture provided that the trustees could
invest the funds of the trust in either government bonds or Duke
Power Company securities, other investments being prohibited. In
1962 over 80% of the trust was invested in common stock of Duke
Power, and over 95%o of the remaining common stock was invested
in two aluminum companies.2 The trustees brought an action for
modification of the trust instrument to permit them to invest in
stocks and bonds of corporations other than Duke Power. Basing
their opinion on New Jersey law because of the terms of the trust
instrument,' the North Carolina Supreme Court said that a court
'20% of net income is to be set aside until an additional $40,000,000 has
been added to the trust. The remaining income is payable 32% to Duke Uni-
versity, 32% to such nonprofit hospitals in North and South Carolina as the
trustees select, 5% to Davidson College, 5% to Furman University, 4% to
Johnson C. Smith University, 10% to nonprofit organizations in North and
South Carolina selected by the trustees which are engaged in caring for
orphans, 2% for care of needy retired Methodist preachers, or widows and
orphans of deceased Methodist preachers in North Carolina, 6% to be used
in erecting rural Methodist churches in North Carolina, and 4% for main-
tenance and supervision of such churches. Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1,
5-6, 131 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1963).
2 Stocks in companies other than Duke Power were received from either
Mr. Duke or his estate. In 1962 the number of shares and the values of
aluminum company stocks held by the trust were as follows: 791,040 shares
of Aluminum Ltd., of Canada, valued at $17,402,880; 639,644 shares of Al-
coa common, valued at $35,180,420; 59,300 shares of Alcoa preferred, worth
$5,040,500. Id. at 13, 131 S.E.2d at 916.
'The trust by its express language is "executed bya resident of the State
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of equity may authorize a trustee to disregard the provisions of the
trust instrument limiting his authority with respect to the kind of
securities in which he may invest, but that the evidence in this case
did not justify exercise of that power.
4
The trustees could invest funds of the trust in either Duke Power
securities or government bonds, neither of which appeared desirable
to them. On the one hand they felt it would not be advisable, from a
diversification standpoint, to purchase additional securities of Duke
Power, because of the size of the trust's holding of that corporation's
securities.5 On the other hand, they felt it unwise to invest in fixed-
dollar obligations since additional funds would be needed in the
future to offset inflation and increasing population." Thus, the trus-
tees argued, neither government bonds nor Duke Power securities
offered attractive investment potential for the trust fund; therefore
they should be allowed to invest in securities of companies other than
Duke Power to protect the beneficiaries and the objects of the trust.
The plaintiffs' evidence showed that since the creation of the
trust the country has entered a period of general inflation which has
not yet ended, and that the cost of higher education and hospital
costs have increased and probably will continue to increase faster
than average.7 Officials of the beneficiary colleges projected large
increases in enrollment as well as in educational costs per student
in the future." Trust investment experts testified that they were of
the opinion that "proper safeguarding of the corpus of the Endow-
ment requires a greater degree of diversification" 9 and "that the
of New Jersey in said State, is intended to be made, administered and given
effect under and in accordance with the present existing laws of said State,
notwithstanding it may be administered and the beneficiaries hereof may be
located in whole or in part in other states, and the validity and construction
thereof shall be determined and governed in all respects by such laws and
statutes." Id. at 8, 131 S.E.2d at 913. See note 14, infra, for a discussion of
other possible implications of this language.
" Cocke v. Duke. Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
'Also, a witness of the trustees had testified that Duke Power is now a
mature company which cannot expect future expansion at a rate comparable
to that of the past. Id. at 19, 131 S.E.2d at 921.
' There was evidence showing that the needs of the beneficiaries will




260 N.C. at 14, 131 S.E.2d at 917.
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restrictive investment provisions set forth in the Indenture consti-
tute a threat to the safety of the Endowment corpus."'1
The court referred to a New Jersey statute'1 and two cases in
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals'12 as "declaring the
law which must be applied here."' 8 Briefly stated, the law upon
which the court relied holds that in order to change investment pro-
cedures in New Jersey, the trustee must show that because of
changes in conditions not anticipated by the settlor, such a change
would be necessary to avoid frustration of the purposes of the trust,
and that the new investment policy would be advantageous to the
purposes of the trust and to all, beneficiaries. It would seem that the
North Carolina court properly applied the present law of New Jersey
in reaching its decision.' 4 Although there was substantial evidence
1 0Ibid.
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, ch. 15, § 15 (b) (1953), which reads in part: "If
the court shall find that by reason of a change in conditions which occurs
since the creation of the trust or which may be reasonably foreseen, the ob-
jects of the trust might be defeated in whole or in part by the investment...
of all the funds of such trust in the kinds of investments to which the trustee
is then limited by the statutes of this state or by the instrument.., creating
such trust and that the objects of the trust and the interests of all the bene-
ficiaries thereof.., would be promoted by the investment of all, or some part,
of the trust fund otherwise, the court shall ... authorize or direct the trustee
... to invest.., in any class of investments, including common or preferred
stocks of corporations .... "
"= Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (1939) ; Reiner v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 78, 8 A.2d 175 (1939) ; rev'd 127 N.J. Eq. 377,
13 A.2d 291 (1940). In the Bliss case a large portion of the principal of a
trust under a will was invested in railroad-bonds; under the terms of the
will the trustees could reinvest funds of the trust in legal securities. Both
income and corpus diminished considerably, and the trustee sought permission
to reinvest in common and preferred stocks, which were not legal trust in-
vestments. The court said that under the provisions of the will the trustee
had broad investment power and denied authority to make the proposed in-
vestments because there was no evidence that the purposes of the trust were
likely to be defeated if the required change were denied. In the Reiner case
a trust's income was to be paid to the settlor's daughter; distribution of the
principal to her was to be made over aperiod of years. Income from legal
securities had shrunk from over $70,000 in 1925 to $54,000 in 1937, but there
had been no substantial diminution of the principal. The court was asked
to empower the trustee to invest portions of the trust fund in common stock.
The court refused because there was no evidence that the purposes of the
trust would have been defeated if the requested investments were not al-
lowed.
260 N.C. at 8, 131 S.E.2d at 913.
A question arises, however, as to whether or not current New Jersey
law should have been applied in the case. The general rule governing the
administration of an inter vivos trust is stated in RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT
oF LAws § 297 (1934), as follows: "A trust of movables created by
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showing why it would have been advantageous to grant the re-
quested relief, there was not sufficient evidence of the -necessity of
an instrument inter vivos is administered by the trustee according to
the law of the state where the instrument creating the trust locates the ad-
ministration of the trust." Comment d thereunder says, "In order to deter-
mine where the administration of the trust is located, consideration is given
to the provisions of the instrument, the residence of the trustees, the residence
of the beneficiaries, the location of the property, the place where the business
of the trust is to be carried on." A majority of the trustees reside in North
Carolina; most of the beneficiaries are located in North and South Carolina;
the physical location of the securities held by the trust is in New York.
Record, p. 206. The Endowment maintains two of its three offices in North
Carolina. Thus, taking into consideration the elements set out above by the
Restatement, it would seem that the trust would be administered according to
the law of North Carolina, or possibly South Carolina or New York, nothing
appearing in the trust instrument to the contrary. But the draftsman foresaw
that a controversy might arise with respect to the administration of the trust
and for that reason provided in the indenture that the trust was to be ad-
ministered "in accordance with the present existing laws and statutes of
[New Jersey]" (emphasis added). 260 N.C. at 8, 131 S.E.2d at 913. If this
language be interpreted to mean that future administrative acts be accord-
ing to the law of New Jersey as of the date of each act, then it would ap-
pear that the court properly based the decision on the statute and two sub-
sequent cases, since the statute would apply to trusts created before its pas-
sage. See Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 78, 8 A.2d 175
(Ch. 1939). But if the language be interpreted as requiring that the trust
be administered according to the laws of New Jersey at the time of the crea-
tion of the trust, then the statute and above cases would not seem to be
authority on which to base the decision, because the trust was created in
1924, thirteen years before the statute passed and long before the cases were
decided by the Court of Errors and Appeals. Under this interpretation it
would seem that the settlor, in effect, included in the indenture his own rules
governing administration of the trust, to be used wherever the trust was
being administered. To put it another way, he incorporated by reference
into the trust indenture the 1924 laws of New Jersey, which became part
of the indenture itself. Thus it would appear that a subsequent New Jersey
statute would have no effect upon it. This point was raised by the de-
fendants, Brief for Defendants, pp. 39-43, but the court did not explain why it
held that the statute and cases declared "the law which must be applied
here."
Apparently courts of chancery in New Jersey had jurisdiction in 1924
to permit investments of trust funds in securities other than those allowed
by the trust instrument. See Price v. Long, 87 N.J. Eq. 578, 101 A. 195
(1917). Two later cases have said that courts of equity have always had
the inherent authority to do so. Morris Community Chest v. Wilentz, 124
N.J. Eq. 580, 3 A.2d 808 (1939); New Jersey Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lincoln Mortgage and Title Guar. Co., 105 N.J. Eq. 557, 148 A. 713 (1930).
But the court could exercise the power only in an emergency, where the
circumstances required that something be done. Price v. Long, supra. Thus
the 1937 statute and subsequent cases, though 'perhaps incorrectly applied
in the principal case, have not significantly changed the law in this area,
and under the law prevailing in New Jersey at the time the trust was created
a similar result probably would have been reached.
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doing so. It was on this ground that the court granted the motion
for nonsuit.
The instant case would seem to fall within the scope of the gen-
erally accepted doctrine that equity has no authority to alter a trust
merely to improve a settlor's gift to the beneficiaries.' Under this
view the power to permit deviation by the trustee should be limited
to emergency situations that threaten the purposes of the trust.
The general principle being acknowledged, the critical question is
what circumstances actually do create an emergency warranting
deviation. An interesting comparison to the principal case is afforded
by two fairly recent cases, Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co.'" and In re Trusteeship under Agreement with Mayo.'
In the Stanton case the trust instrument executed in 1930 pro-
vided that investments by trustees should be made only in bonds of
the federal government, states or municipalities, or in corporate
bonds rated at least "AA" by Moody's Investment Service.' s Total
dollar values of the trust in the following years were as follows:
1931-3,460,516 dollars; 1936-2,323,719 dollars; 1954-2,860,-
687 dollars.'9 Income in 1938 was 88,891 dollars and in 1954 was
109,943 dollars.20 The plaintiff felt that the evidence showed a
marked decline in the purchasing power of the dollar and the return
on bonds (as compared to the return on common stocks). However,
the court observed that there was no evidence of any beneficiary's
being in want, or of the distributable income being insufficient to
supply the reasonable needs of all the beneficiaries. The court ad-
mitted that inflation had occurred in the past, but said that no one
knows whether or not it will continue in the future. The court felt it
should not try to guess what economic conditions might be in the
future by permitting the deviation where no real need or emergency
was shown, and refused to allow deviation.
5 See, e.g., Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A.2d 540 (1943) ; Porter
v. Porter, 138 Me. 1, 20 A.2d 465 (1941); Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank,
291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956) ; John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb.
3, 299 N.W. 261 (1941) ; Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hosp., 174 Ohio St.
124, 187 N.E.2d 36 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 167, com-
ment c (1959); 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 561 (1946).
10 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010 (1957).
17259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960).
1 Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763,
766, 310 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1957).
"Old. at 767, 310 P.2d at 1013.
"8Id. at 771, 310 P.2d at 1016.
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In the Mayo case there were two trusts set up-one in 1917
and the other in 1919. The donor died in 1939. The investment
provisions of both said the following: "The TRUSTEES shall...
manage, care for and protect said fund all in accordance with their
best judgment and discretion, invest and re-invest the same in real
estate mortgages, municipal bonds or any other form of income
bearing property (but not real estate or corporate stock) .... "21
The value of the assets of the larger trust was $957,712 in 1940 and
$968,893 in 1958; but due to inflation the value oi the trust in
terms of 1940 dollar values was only $456,140 at the later date. 2
That is, the actual value of the trust fund, in terms of purchasing
power, had been cut almost in half since 1940, due to inflation. A
similar decline in purchasing power had taken place in regard to the
smaller trust. The court said that unless deviation was ordered the
dominant intention of the donor to prevent a loss of the principal
would be frustrated; and that unless deviation be allowed, the assets
of the trusts within the next twenty years would be worth less than
one-fourth of their value at the time of the donor's death. Another
factor considered was that stocks are now sounder investments than
they were at the time the trust was created, due to increased govern-
ment and exchange regulations and improved management. The
court felt that the trustees should have the right to deviate from the
restrictive provisions of the trust and permitted them to invest a
reasonable amo-ant of the trusts in corporate stocks. In this way
the trusts were to be fortified against inflation.
When the court in the Mayo case found that the dominant in-
tention of the donor was to prevent a loss in the principal, it pro-
vided itself with a necessary fact upon which to base its decision.
23
Also it would seem that the court was sensible in recognizing that
inflation decreases the value of the principal even though its value
in dollars does not decrease, and in recognizing the probability of
" 259 Minn. at 92-3, 105 N.W.2d at 902.
2 Id. at 93, 105 N.W.2d at 902.
" In Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hosp., 174 Ohio St 124, 187 N.E.2d
36 (1962), the plaintiff relied upon the Mayo case in seeking to deviate from
the investment provisions of the trust instrument because inflation had de-
valued the purchasing power of the dollar. In denying relief the court said,
"The court in the Mayo case reached these two conclusions by first con-
cluding that the dominant intention of the testator was to preserve the corpus
of the trust. It is difficult for this court to reach that conclusion under this
trust...." Id. at 127, 187 N.E.2d at 39.
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future inflation. Because of the facts found in Stanton, there was no
basis upon which to hold that the purpose of the trust was threat-
ened, and so the court could not grant relief. It is regrettable that
the court in Stanton took the narrow view prohibiting recognition
of future inflation, because this approach seems to ignore a strong
economic trend of recent years which is generally expected to con-
tinue.24 Although the trust in the principal case was charitable
rather than private,"5 the facts of that case would seem to be more
in line with the Stanton case than with Mayo, since there were not
sufficient findings of substantial danger to the accomplishment of the
trust purpose. Although the investment provisions do not seem to
be the best possible, this alone is not a sufficient ground to change
them under general trust principles and the laws of New Jersey.
In spite of this, a slightly different emphasis by the court would have
allowed a more advantageous holding without violating established
trust principles. The court could have found justifiably that the
trust's purposes were substantially endangered by the investment
restrictions. From the settlor's instructions to add part of the in-
come to the principal, the court could have plausibly concluded that
the settlor's main intention was either to prevent loss of the principal
or to increase the size of the trust fund. Under either conclusion
his intention could have been defeated because of the great imbalance
of investments which subjects the trust to undue risk. If the court
felt the latter to be his ifitention, it could have reasonably determined
that the investment restrictions would retard the growth of the trust
fund, thereby defeating the settlor's intention partially or wholly.
Likewise, the court could have determined that the investment re-
strictions would prevent growth of the trust fund at a rate sufficient
to meet the beneficiaries' needs in the future, when additional funds
would be necessary because of increased population and inflation,
thereby thwarting the settlor's obvious intention to fulfill their
needs. Thus, as was done in Mayo, the court could have furnished
" "Among the few things which economists predict with any degree of
confidence is that-with some possible exceptional periods-prices will, on
the average, be higher in future decades than they are today." Why Prices
Stay Up, Nati6n's Business, Feb., 1963, p. 64. But see Upgren, The Ameri-
can Economy: 1933 to 1973, 17 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 329 (1963).
2 Since the typical charitable trust is intended to last a very long time, it
is reasonable and necessary to allow the trustee more flexibility than in the
case of private trusts. See 4 PoWELL ON REAL PoPERTY 488 § 579 (1954).
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itself with a basis upon which to hold that the trust purposes were
endangered, thereby fulfilling the requirement necessary to allow
deviation under existing law.
CowLEs LIIPFERT
Wills-Incorporation by Reference-Invalid Instruments
In Godwin v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.1 husband and wife
executed a trust agreement which the court conceded to be void as an
inter vivos trust because of the draftsman's failure to obtain and
certify a private examination of the wife as required by section 52-12
of the General Statutes. Both husband and wife executed wills of
even date with the trust instrument, each disposing of his property as
provided in the trust agreement. After the wife's death the husband
executed a new will which differed substantially from the terms of
the trust agreement. In an action by the trustee seeking specific per-
formance of an alleged contract between husband and wife to will
their property according to the terms of the trust agreement, the
court held that the trust agreement was incorporated in the respective
wills by reference; that the wills themselves established the existence
of the alleged contract; and that the trustee was entitled to specific
performance for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the original
wills.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference2 is recognized in Eng-
land and in a great majority of American jurisdictions.3 Four fea-
1259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456 (1963).
2 This doctrine should not be confused with the closely related doctrine of
"facts of independent legal significance." Professor Scott states, in reference
to the latter doctrine, that: "[A] disposition made in a will is not invalid
although its terms do not fully appear in the will,,if those terms can be ascer-
tained from facts which have significance apart from their effect upon the
disposition in the will. The existence of a trust at the time of the testator's
death, created by him at some time prior to his death, is such a fact. It is
not the trust instrument, but the trust itseLf, which. has independent sig-
nificance." 1 Scor, TRusTs § 54.3, at 367 (2d ed. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
Since a valid inter vivos trust was never created here, and the trust in-
strument cannot be a fact of independent significance, this doctrine would
seem inapplicable.
' ATxINSOX, WILLS § 80, at 385 nn. 4-5 (2d ed. 1953), and cases cited
therein. The doctrine is stated thusly in Newton v. Seaman's Friend
Soc'y, 130 Mass. 91, 93 (1881) : "If a will, executed and witnessed as re-
quired by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any document or paper
not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be in the form
of a will or codicil, or of a deed of indenture, or of a mere list or memoran-
1964]
